Will
Pakistan become ‘Islamistan’? And how soon? This is the question which bothers
many a mind in the whole South Asia region. People beyond the South Asian
region are worried too, because its repercussions will be far and wide.
There
has been a demand by the orthodox section of Sunni Muslim society of Pakistan
that the State of Pakistan be run strictly according to the principles of
Sharia, i.e. the Islamic Laws, of their interpretation. That the democratic
constitution be replaced with a new constitution which will establish an
Islamic Caliphate of Pakistan instead of an Islamic Republic of Pakistan. That
the warriors of Islam will achieve this through jihad, which is a holy War
conducted by means of unlimited violence against centres of state power as well
as civilian population. These warriors, currently known as the Pakistani
Taliban, will create what may be called ‘Islamistan’, the land of Islam, the
closest example of which was the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan between 1996
and 2001.
Pakistan
was created in 1947 as a state for the Muslims of United India. The Pakistan
movement was driven by the belief that in post-British India, the Hindu
majority will tend to dominate the politics of the country and Muslims will not
get their due share of power. After the demand for the Pakistan was conceded,
but a few days before the new state was born, Mohammed Ali Jinnah on 11 August
1947 in a speech in the constituent assembly of Pakistan advised his countrymen
to regard religion as a purely personal matter and not allow it to interfere in
the politics of the country. However, when the process of constitution making
began in Pakistan, the orthodox section of Pakistani society made sure that the
Objectives Resolution adopted by the constituent assembly on 12 March 1948
contained an assurance that the Muslims of Pakistan shall be enabled to “order
their lives” in accordance with “the teachings and requirements of Islam as set
out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah”.
From
then onwards, through different stages of the political and constitutional
evolution of Pakistan, the Sunni dominated Muslim political parties and
organisations launched agitation from time to time and succeeded in getting
increasingly more pro-Islamic provisions introduced in the constitutional and
legal framework of the country. Pakistan’s army which controlled the government
of the country directly or indirectly for most of its history made the Islamic
parties like Jamaat-e-Islami its allies in supressing domestic opposition.
Mainstream political parties like the Muslim League and the People’s Party also
found it difficult to resist the demands of the Islamists which were always
backed by uncontrollable street power. The crowning glory of Islamists was
their incorporation by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq as the main instrument of anti-Soviet
jihad in Afghanistan from 1979-1989.
After
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan’s security
establishment used these veterans of anti-Soviet jihad to launch an invasion of
Afghanistan which was in a state of civil war and succeeded in capturing Kabul
in 1996 under the leadership of the so-called Taliban. The Taliban allowed
themselves to be influenced by Al-Qaeda leadership which had been a participant
in the anti-Soviet jihad. The two together used the Afghan soil to launch the
9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001. The retaliatory attack by the United
States and its allies on Afghanistan in October 2001 resulted in the defeat of
Taliban most of whose cadres and leadership along with that of al-Qaeda fled to
Pakistan in the winter of 2001-2002.
The arrival of al-Qaeda in Pakistan in 2001
brought about a qualitative change in the agenda of the Islamist movement of
Pakistan. Until now, the objective of Islamist parties was to get the
constitution and laws of Pakistan as much Islamised as possible through
agitations and pressure tactics against the state. From now on, under the
guidance of al-Qaeda, the objective was re-defined as capture of state power
through violent means and establishment of an Islamic Caliphate to be run
according to the principles of Sharia. Initially, the demand for the imposition
of Sharia took the form of stray incidents of violence by Sunni groups
protesting against Pakistan government’s support for the US led war on terror.
After the Lal Masjid operation of 2007 conducted by President Musharraf to
flush out militants, a number of Sunni militant organisations got together
under one umbrella called Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with the declared
objective of establishing a Sharia rule in Pakistan.
The
key demands of the Pakistani Taliban can be summed up as follows: i)
Introduction of Sharia, i.e. Islamic laws; ii) Islamic system of education;
iii) End to interest based banking; iv) Immediate replacement of democratic
system of government by an Islamic one; v) Immediate withdrawal of army from
tribal areas; vi) Closing down all army check-posts; vii) Immediate release of
all arrested Taliban cadres.
Even
a man of ordinary intelligence would know that these demands cannot be
fulfilled in Pakistan which has a democratic constitution. The militants have
therefore been trying to register their demands through violence. According to
a statement filed in the Supreme Court by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies on
26 March 2014, Pakistan has lost 49,000 lives in militancy since 11 September
2001. More than 24,000 people, both civilian and troops, were killed in
terrorist attacks during the period 2001 and 2008. Another 25,000 died during
military offensives against Taliban insurgents in the tribal regions since
2008. Besides, 15,681 casualties have been suffered by the armed forces in the
tribal areas since 2008. The bomb blasts and suicide attacks have led to
another 5,152 civilians dead and 5,678 civilians injured since 2008.
While
loss of civilians and security forces is enormous, what lends political and
strategic significance to the activities of the militants is their attacks on
high value military targets. Such attacks since 2007 would reflect an effort on
their part to capture state power through violent means. In May 2011, the
Taliban attacked Mehran naval base near Karachi and destroyed two US
surveillance aircraft. This was the first major attack on a military target and
is said to have taken place with the involvement of officers sympathetic to the
militants. Earlier in 2009, the military headquarters in Rawalpindi had come
under heavy attack when militants laid siege to the complex for 24 hours
killing 19 persons. On 16 August 2012, the Taliban attacked one of the most
heavily guarded military airbases in Pakistan, the Minhas airbase located near
the Aeronautical Complex at Kamra, 45 miles north-west of Islamabad. The
airbase is believed to store about 100 nuclear warheads which Pakistan
possesses. This was the third such attack on the airbase since 2007, earlier
ones being in December 2007 and August 2009. On 20 January 2014, the militants
attacked a market next to the military headquarters killing 13 people. A day
earlier, they had killed 26 soldiers and wounded 25 others in the north-western
town of Bannu.
Whether
or not the Pakistan government should take military action against Taliban was
a question actively debated within Pakistan ever since Nawaz Sharif’s
government assumed office after May 2013 elections. While the army leadership
was in favour of action, the political leadership lead by Nawaz Muslim League
and supported by Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf was opposed to any action. The
peace negotiations started by the government with the Taliban in March led
nowhere. The massive attack by the Taliban on Karachi airport in the early
hours of 9 June compelled the government to undertake a comprehensive military
action against the Taliban strongholds in North Waziristan on 15 June. While
the prospects of success of this operation are being debated in the Pakistani
media, it may be worthwhile to make an assessment of the support that the
Taliban have in society.
A
survey conducted by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies in April 2010 based
on 1,568 respondents representative of all regions, age groups and educational
backgrounds revealed two significant findings. To the question whether you
consider the struggle for implementation of Sharia as a jihad, those who said
‘yes’ were 63% from Punjab, 70.8% from NWFP, 69.7% from Balochistan, 36.6% from
Sindh, 65.7% from FATA, 62.5% from Islamabad, 27.5 % from Gilgit-Baltistan, and
59.7% from AJK. To another question, whether the militants in Indian-held
Kashmir are engaged in jihad, those who said ‘yes’ were 57.1% from Punjab,
64.6% from NWFP, 57.3% from Balochistan, 39.7% from Sindh, 6% from FATA, 65%
from Islamabad, 11.8 % from Gilgit-Baltistan, and 89.6% from AJK. This means
that in Pakistani society the demand for the imposition of Sharia is quite high.
Similarly, the support for jihad in Kashmir is also noteworthy.
The
question that remains to be answered is whether the Pakistani army is also
radicalised and if so, to what extent? This question is not easy to answer
because the evidence available is only circumstantial. The commonly held view
is that a section of the army is strongly radicalised because otherwise so many
Taliban attacks on sensitive military targets would not be possible. There is a
scholarly view held by a distinguished academic Pervez Hoodbhoy that Pakistan
indeed has two armies. There is Army I which is pro-status quo and then there
is Army II which may be called as Allah’s Army and wants to change the status
quo. That the army leadership is divided on the question of policy towards
Taliban is also obvious from the fact that sometimes the army is soft on
Taliban, distinguishing the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’ Taliban and sometimes it
advocates strong action against them.
The
future of Pakistan and the future of Pakistan’s relations with India depends on
the extent to which the security establishment of Pakistan is able to eliminate
militancy led by TTP, LeT and other organisations. There are grave doubts that
the operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan will fully serve this purpose. The
malaise seems to have gone much deeper and widespread in Pakistan. The military
solution is not enough. Someone must have the courage and conviction to say
that a modern state cannot be run on the basis of Sharia. The country must be
guarded against the negative impact of the establishment of a Caliphate in
parts of Iraq and Syria, and the likelihood of Afghanistan being dominated by
Taliban.
But
this is easier said than done. If not, the possibility of Taliban capturing
power in Pakistan directly or indirectly in the next ten years cannot be ruled
out. In the process, Pakistan will of course lose its identity. But a Taliban
ruled Pakistan will have grave implications for India. It will completely
de-stabilise India and shake it to its very roots. It will engulf the entire
Jammu and Kashmir in flames again. It will hold the whole of India to ransom
for demands which cannot be met. India will be faced with a prolonged
asymmetric warfare for which it may not be prepared. Unfortunately, these are
not matters which diplomats of the two countries will ever discuss. Therefore,
let us hope for the best, but be prepared for the worst.
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