India has allowed an image to be created in the
chanceries of the world that it is a reluctant power, unwilling to use force in
defence of its national interest. Over the last fifteen years, it has taken a
beating at the hands of Pakistan and China, and has not been able to develop a
suitable response to Pakistan’s aggressiveness and China’s coerciveness. Even
when it was victorious in a war, it failed to take advantage of its victory by
extracting the fruits of victory in 1947-48, while successfully preventing
Pakistan from capturing the state of Jammu and Kashmir, we stopped short of
recovering the whole territory from Pakistani occupation.
In 1965, we won the war, but
returned the strategically important area of Haji Pir Pass after occupying it
while signing the peace agreement at Tashkent in January 1966. In 1971, we won
the war and delivered independence to Bangladesh, but failed to get the ceasefire
line in Kashmir converted into an international border while signing the Simla
Agreement in January 1972. In 1999 during Kargil War, we drove the enemy back
across the Line of Control, but did not cross the LoC to destroy the terrorist
training camps in PoK.
When India’s Parliament House was
attacked by Jaish-e-Mohammed militants in December 2001, we mobilised around
5,00,000 troops and three armoured divisions under the code name of “Operation
Parakram”, but decided not to attack Pakistan because of the US intervention.
When Lashkar-e-Tayyeba militants
attacked Mumbai in November 2008, we again decided not to take any retaliatory
action for fear of getting involved in the war which might lead to crossing the
nuclear threshold. More recently in January 2016 when Pathankot airbase was
attacked by Jaish militants, we drew enormous satisfaction from the fact that
we succeeded in killing all the militants and the thought of any retaliatory
action did not even enter our minds, particularly because we were basking in
the glory of Prime Minister Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore on 25 December, the
birthday of Nawaz Sharif.
Ever since the development of
nuclear weapons capability by Pakistan in 1987, we are paralysed in the
formulation of our response because Pakistan threatened to unleash their
nuclear weapons against India if India used its superior conventional might in
the event of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Our paralysis at the military front
encouraged Pakistan to continue its terrorist attacks. After every terrorist
attack, we suspended bilateral dialogue with Pakistan and made its resumption
conditional on concrete action against terrorists. That action never came. Nor
will it ever come. Our policymakers must understand the reasons to be able to get
on the right track with regard to Pakistan.
Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, the
organisation responsible for the 26/11 attack, and Jaish-e-Mohammed, the outfit
which carried out the Parliament attack and the Pathankot airbase attack are
both Punjab-based organisations, heavily admired and protected by the people of
Punjab. The biggest value of these organisations is that Pakistan Muslim League
(N) and Jamaat-e-Islami rely on them for mobilising votes and providing muscle
power at the time of provincial and national elections. While this is a strong
enough reason for the civil and military leadership not to touch them, the fear
of death to anyone opposing them compounds the situation. The high popularity
graph of these organisations in Punjab is explained by the charity work done by
them, which in turn is funded by the industrialists and traders of Punjab. And
of course, the security establishment which floated these organisations would
like to continue to use them for strategic objectives in Afghanistan, Kashmir,
rest of India and against the US, the Jews and so on.
In the words of Mujahid Hussain,
the author of a pioneering work on extremism in Punjab, “There are hundreds of
thousands of people in Pakistan who support Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba
and love their ‘jihadi performance’ and who firmly trust that India would
disintegrate sooner or later if these organisations continue their present
activities, and not only will Kashmiris but the Muslims of India will also get
freedom.” Talking of Jaish-e-Mohammed, the author says that Bahawalpur,
Rahimyarkhan and Bahawalnagar districts are its strongholds “as thousands of
youth are recruited from these districts not only for jihad in Kashmir and for
Al Qaeda and Taliban’s assistance in Afghanistan, but also for the sectarian
killing spree within the country”.
Lack of evidence against LeT and
JeM for acts of terrorism in India will continue to be the reason for Pakistani
courts to not take any action against them. On this the Pakistani state and
society seem to be firmly united. It is futile for India to keep waiting for
action against them before holding the dialogue. While dialogue may or may not
be pursued, Indian policymakers will have to seriously think of options in the
realm of deterrence and/or retaliation in the event of a terrorist attack. The
dilemma that holds India back must be resolved.
We find ourselves helpless in the
face of China’s assertiveness and coerciveness as well. The well-known Chinese
strategic dictum is “to win a war without having to fight a battle”. Constant
coercion in whatever form possible and deliberate delay in resolving disputes
with the adversary is the Chinese way of getting the best terms from the enemy
at the negotiating table. That is why despite eighteen rounds of Special
Representative Talks on the border dispute we are nowhere near a solution.
Major border trespassings took place at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in
2013 and 2014 and minor ones continue periodically and are justified on the
plea of different perceptions of the LAC on both sides.
China continues to lay claim to Arunachal Pradesh
and insists that Tawang belongs to China being formerly a part of Tibet. It
disregards the fact that Arunachal Pradesh is represented in the Indian
Parliament. China continues to support the Pakistani occupation of
Pakistan-held Kashmir and reinforces this occupation by undertaking development
projects in that region. We lost our leverage vis-a-vis China by recognising
Tibet as a part of China. There is nothing left in our strategic armoury to
deter China from committing acts of aggression or coercion against us. China’s
aim is to keep us down and out as a supplicant in the Chinese court begging for
resolution of the border dispute.
The strategy of improving
relations in other areas pending the resolution of the border dispute has also
failed. There is no doubt that China has emerged as our largest trading partner
but out of the total trade of $72 billion in 2014-15, the trade deficit against
us was of the magnitude of $48.5 billion. There is no hope of the situation
being remedied in the near future. Chinese FDI in India from 2000 to 2015 was
barely $1.2 billion. China has not been enthusiastic about India becoming a
permanent member of the Security Council and is totally opposed to India’s membership
of the Nuclear India should be confident of the fact that it is a ranking
power.
According to a study done by
Foundation for National Security Research in 2012, India ranks 8th in terms of
economic capability in the world and 7th in terms of military capability, as
compared with China 2nd and 3rd respectively and Pakistan 27th and 11th
respectively. Economic capability was computed on the basis of GDP, foreign
trade and growth rate while military capability was computed on the basis of
armed forces and equipment, defence expenditure and doctrinal issues.
In terms of GDP (PPP-based),
India ranks number 3; in military manpower, India is at number 2. In defence
spending, India ranks number 4, along with Germany.
If India lacks something, it is
political will to act. There is something missing in our strategic culture
because of which we are not able to act assertively. Our wish to emerge as a
major power does not seem to be commensurate with our will to act to defend our
interests and to play a due role in discharging global responsibilities.
The
writer is editor of India’s National Security Annual Review and a former JNU
professor
Published in The Asian Age, 16 March 2016
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